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Introduction 
It has been decided now that the European single currency (the euro) will be 
launched in January 1999 with 11 countries joining in the first wave of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
While Denmark, Sweden and the UK decided not to join in the first wave, 
Greece for the moment fails by a wide margin to satisfy the criteria for 
participation set out in the European Union's Maastricht Treaty. Whilst the 
Maastricht criteria pertain solely to convergence in inflation performance and 
"stability orientation", the criteria offered by the traditional economic theory of 
optimal currency areas (OCAs) cover additional dimensions. 
The principal motivation for this paper is to ask the question, whether, in 
the light of traditional OCA criteria, the prospective EMU appears to be a 
homogenous group of countries - or whether, on the contrary, a "core group" 
can be distinguished from other "periphery" groups. This is an important 
question since the sustainability of EMU depends on the existence of reasonable 
degree of homogeneity and is threatened by evidence of the contrary; in 
addition, the analysis may throw light on the rationality of the decision by three 
of the countries which could qualify under the Maastricht Treaty to "hang back" 
from joining the first wave1• A further motivation for the paper is to explore 
how far, among the set of OCA criteria, a concentration on just two - bilateral 
trade and symmetry in output shocks - is representative of the rest. Finally, the 
results in the paper depend on the use of cluster analysis; whilst this is a well-
known technique in the science of pattern recognition, and commonly applied 
in other disciplines, its use in applied economic analysis is comparatively rare. 
A subsidiary motivation of the paper is thus to lay out an example by which the 
usefulness of the method may be judged. 
The remainder of the paper contains four sections. The first section outlines 
the OCA criteria and the particular interpretation given to them in this paper. In 
I. The countries in question are the UK, Sweden, and Denmark. None of the three 
appears exceptional in relation to the Maastricht Treaty, except - in the case of the UK 
and Sweden - in relation to the Treaty's requirement that a qualifying country should 
have participated in the "normal bands" of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for 
at least two years without promoting a devaluation of its currency and without 
excessive strain. Neither of the two countries was a member of the ERM at the time 
of the decision on membership. The UK government has queried the applicability of 
this criterion in light of the change in the ERM brought about in the wake of the 1993 
speculative crisis. 
section 11 the methodology of cluster analysis is introduced; in section Ill we 
report and discuss the main results. Section IV provides a summary of the 
principal results and conclusions extending the use of pattern recognition 
techniques by giving a "faces" representation of our main findings. 
I. Optimal Currency Area Criteria 
The foundations of the traditional theory of optimal currency areas (OCAs) were 
laid by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), with important elaborations by, 
among others, Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1990). These foundations were laid 
before the concern for inflation. control .. came to do~in~te policy discussion; 
more recent contributions to the theory of optimal currency areas liave privileged 
that concern and are indeed amply reflected in the criteria introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty. Tavlas (1993) provides a useful perspective. 
Whilst the importance of a common adherence to standards of inflation 
control and "stability orientation" in economic policies among the members of 
a currency union cannot be gainsaid, the criteria of traditional OCA theory are 
not made irrelevant by recognition of this fact. Applying these criteria to the 
prospective members of the EMU is useful to the extent that they remain valid. 
Only one serious challenge has been mounted to their validity (as opposed to 
their incompleteness, if they omit reference to the need for agreement on the 
counter-inflationary qualities of the common monetary policy). This challenge 
(see Frankel and Rose, 1996) is eiJlbodied inthe suggestionthatth-e~rit~na-lliiD­
be"endogt;:nous" in the important se_nse thatthe existence ofa.currency union 
formed of countries ini!ially not positively indicated to participate in such a 
~~ion will in itself foster conditions in which the criteria are subsequently 
positi\'ely s::ttisfieg. The title of a paper by Frankel and Rose (1997) - "Is EMU 
more justifiable ex-post than ex-ante?" - in which they speculatively apply this 
idea to EMU is eloquent. At the present time, however, empirical support for the 
"endogeneity" view remains suggestive rather than conclusive. It does not render 
an analysis such as the current one uninteresting. 
It is useful to give a concentrated version of the OCA argument. The benefit 
of a common currency will be the larger the greater the scope for economizing 
on exchange costs by adopting it (i.e. the greater the volume of trade), whilst the 
costs of adopting the common currency are essentially the negative of the 
benefits of having an independent monetary policy and exchange rate. These are 
the larger the more idiosyncratic the shocks hitting the economy, and the more 
effective an independent monetary policy is in counteracting them (especially, 
the greater the effectiveness of changes in the nominal exchange rate); where 
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policy is ineffective or unreliable, then the disbenefits can be offset if there 
exists some form of federal fiscal arrangement binding the countries in the 
union, or if labour mobility between the countries is high. 
In the absence of labour mobility across boundaries, more modem 
arguments would suggest that a greater degree of internal labour market 
flexibility will help mitigate the damaging effects of idiosyncratic output shocks. 
In this paper we propose statistical correlates to capture the basic arguments 
of OCA theory. As the cluster analysis technique we use essentially runs offl! 
similarities in data, our procedure will be to nominate Germany a priori as thei 
centre country and then to measure our chosen variables relative to Germany. I 
The groups we subsequently identify will then be similar in respect of their)' 
characteristics vis-a-vis Germany. We now turn to consider each of the variables 
proposed. _J 
Synchronisation in business cycle phase 
In terms of measurement it has become popular to implement the OCA criterion 
related to symmetry of output shocks by studying the cross-correlation of the 
cyclical components of output (e.g. Artis and Zhang 1996, 1997); an alternative 
is to identify shocks by applying an SV AR technique as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993). Proponents of the latter approach argue that this facilitates 
the separate identification of initial shock and policy (and other) response, which 
are confounded in the business cycle approach. However, there is a cost to the 
SV AR approach also, since the identification does not come for free but 
involves the assumption of a particular model. We prefer the more "atheoretical" 
business cycle approach and adopt here the method of Baxter and Stockman 
(1989), identifying symmetry in output shocks with the cross-correlations of the 
cyclic.al compone~ts of monthly industrial production series, detrended by 
applymg the Hodnck-Prescott filter. The cross-correlations are measured for all 
the countries in our sample, with reference to Germany. Thus the study assumes 
that Germany is the putative centre country of the currency union2• 
2 The Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied here with a relatively high value for the dampening 
parameter (A) of 50,000. The figure was chosen in light of the fact that our industrial 
production data are monthly and are relatively noisy; additionally, in earlier work (Artis and 
Zh~ng, 1996). we found that setting such a value for the dampening parameter reproduces the 
senes of cychc~l components implied by the OECD' s PAT (Phase Average Trend) detrending 
method (see Niisson (1987) for an explanation of the OECD's methodology). 
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Volatility in the real exchange rate 
As explained above, the traditional OCA approach identifies the cost of currency 
union membership with the loss of an independent monetary policy, more 
specifically the loss of a separate exchange rate. Of course, it is the real 
exchange rate that is at issue here, even though monetary policy can only 
directly influence the nominal rate. Thus it is implied that, with an independent 
monetary policy and floating exchange rate, the real exchange rate would be 
able to move "in the right way", responding to the appropriate prompting3• A 
"revealed performance" argument thus suggests that a variable measuring 
variation in the real exchange rate, in the present case against the DM, th~ 
currency of the putative "centre" country, would be appropriate. If there has 
been little cause for variation in the real exchange rate, then little will be 
revealed and the cost of moving to a single currency can be assumed to be 
small. We represent volatility in the real DM exchange rate by the standard 
deviation of the log-difference of real bilateral DM exchange rates, where 
deflation is accomplished using relative wholesale (producer) prices. 
Synchronisation in the real interest rate cycle 
A third variable is also indicated by a "revealed preference" argument. In this 
exercise Germany is taken as the centre country of the currency union. If in fact 
the monetary policy of a candidate country historically has differed little from 
that in Germany the cost of relinquishing independence is accordingly low. 
Th~s ~e assume that synchronisation in real interest rates may be interpreted as 
an md1cator of coordination in monetary policy with Germany. Specifically, we 
measure monetary policy synchronization by reference to the cross-correlation 
of the cyclical components of the real interest rate cycle of a country with that 
in Germany. The de-trending was accomplished by applying the H-P filter to 
monthly series of real interest rates, defined as the difference between a short-
tern nominal rate (assumed to be "set" by the Central Bank) and the rate of 
consum~r ?rice i~fl~tion. Whilst our argument for including this measure among 
o~r s~atlstlc~l ~ntena appeals to the framework provided by traditional OCA 
~ntena, a willingness to commit to partner country policies of high counter-
Inflatio.n~ credibility is an essential component of the 'new' optimal currency 
area cntena (e.g. Tavlas 1993). 
3 It must be admitted that Canzoneri et al. (1996) do not find much evidence for this. 
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Openness to trade 
Optimal currency area theory suggests that countries which trade a great deal 
with each other are good candidates for monetary union (since the benefits of 
monetary union, in terms of transactions costs saving, will be enhanced). Our 
measure of this criterion is provided by data on bilateral trade intensity, i.e. for 
any country i as ( xig+mig)/(xi+m) where xi and mi are exports and imports (of 
goods) and subscript g indicates as destination or source Germany, the centre 
country in this exercise. Viewing this as a measure of benefit it might seem 
preferable to scale this variable by output; little changes in the results if this is 
done, except that the extreme value of bilateral output-weighted trade intensity 
for Austria condemns this country to become an outlier "special case" cluster of 
its own. 
Convergence of inflation 
Whilst the traditional OCA literature offers principally real variables as criteria, 
we supplement these here with a measure of inflation convergence. In fact, the 
traditional OCA literature was generated during the era of "fix-price" economics, 
so introducing inflation convergence as a criterion here could just be regarded 
as an appropriate normalisation. Convergence in inflation performance, both 
actual and political, is of course the central theme of the Maastricht Treaty 
criteria. 
Labour market flexibility 
It is often argued that a currency area will only work well when labour markets 
are flexible across countries in the sense that there is substantial geographic 
mobility within the area. Mundell (1961) seems to have had this definition in 
mind. The consensus on this issue is that labour is much more mobile within the 
US than it is between the European countries and that on these grounds the 
EMU is less likely than the US to be an optimal currency area (see, for 
example, Taylor (1995)). However, it is also argued by Gros and Thygesen 
(1998) that the key consideration for the OCA criteria is the difference between 
interregional labour mobility within countries and labour mobility across 
countries. The data available now suggest that whilst international labour 
mobility is quite low in the European countries, it is not much lower than 
interregional labour mobility within member countries, which is also low. 
Meanwhile, it is generally agreed that in the face of shocks that cannot be easily 
buffered - labour market flexibility tout court is desirable; relatively fast 
adjustment of employment and of wages reduces the persistence in 
unemployment that will otherwise be induced. This type of argument has 
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dominated much of the discussion of the policy adjustment appropriate for 
Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. One measure of the rigidity of labour markets 
that has been used (e.g. OECD, 1994) is a ranking measure of the severity of 
employment protection legislation (EPL); it is such a variable that is used here 
as an indicator of labour market flexibility4• 
The data 
Table 1 displays the data series corresponding to this discussion; data are shown 
for eighteen countries: for all the EU countries except Luxembourg (and 
Germany, which is the reference country of the analysis); for the two West 
European non-EU countries, Norway and Switzerland; and for the USA, Canada 
and Japan, which are introduced as controls. The measurement period generally 
is from April 1979 to September 1995 or later (precise definition and sources 
are shown in Appendix A). It is easiest to comment on these data in the light 
of Table 2, and we defer this discussion to section III below. Meantime, we turn 
to a short exposition of the clustering methods used in this paper. 
4. Buti et al. (1998) provide a recent discussion of the possible significance of this 
variable in labour market adjustment. 
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Table 1. Criteria by optimal currency area theory 
Correlation in Volatility' in Correlation in Trade(% of Inflation Labour market 
business exchange rate interest rate cycle total trade) differential (%) flexihility' 
cycle 
France .683 1.118 .334 16.853 2.365 12 
Italy .459 1.732 .207 18.467 5.744 18 
Netherlands .730 .582 .587 26.181 -.204 7 
Belgium .634 .864 .529 21.353 .835 15 
Denmark .343 1.039 -.015 20.303 2.037 3 
Austria .745 .907 .216 38.525 .432 14 
Ireland .193 1.244 .136 9.650 3.634 10 
Spain .444 1.617 -.141 12.623 5.177 17 
Portugal .474 1.629 .031 14.156 10.398 16 
Switzerland .164 1.297 .420 26.256 .148 4 
Sweden .289 1.835 
-.031 15.515 3.322 11 
Norway .253 1.277 .088 14.643 2.731 9 
Finland -.075 1.769 .095 13.284 2.279 
Greece .235 1.710 n.a.~ 19.132 13.848 n.a.~ 
UK .217 2.174 .017 13.137 3.305 5 
us .106 2.838 .066 4.984 1.871 I 
Canada .123 2.787 .161 1.848 1.910 2 
Japan .744 2.399 .157 4.177 -.856 6 
Notes: 
I. Standard deviation of the log difference in bilateral real exchange rate against deutsche 
mark. 
2. "n.a" denotes that no adequate series are available. 
3. Country rankings of employment protection legislation (1980s) are from the OECD. The 
rank for Germany is 13. 
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11. Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis is proposed in this paper to examine the similarities and 
dissimilarities of economic structure which appear in the variables proposed to 
proxy OCA criteria (Table 1), and to uncover homogeneous subgroups. With the 
EMU agenda in mind, we have measured variables suggested by OCA theory, 
relative to Germany, which is taken as the centre country. The objective is to 
discover whether the data yield sub-groups among the set of countries 
considered such that we might be able to label one of these groups a "core" 
group and the others as "peripheral" groups.In the terminology of cluster 
analysis there are N objects (countries) and p variables (features) in a data set 
(with N=18 and p=6 in this study5), which are denoted as X1, ... ,XN, 
(Xi=(xi1, ... ,xiP) for j=l,2, ... ,N). We take the dissimilarity coefficient or distance, 
d(j,k), between two objects, Xi and Xk, to be defined by the Euclidean distance6 
d(j, k) (I) 
The definition of the dissimilarity coefficient between two clusters is important 
in determining the shape of the homogenous groups. There exist a few 
agglomerative algorithms which differ only in the definition of dissimilarity 
between clusters. We discuss this only briefly here (see, for example, Kaufman 
and Rousseeuw (1990), Anderberg (1993), for more details). In order to examine 
the robustness of the results, two of the most often used approaches are adopted 
in this analysis: the group-average clustering and centroid clustering methods. 
Both of these produce ball-shaped clusters. 
The dissimilarity coefficient, d( roi,rok), of two clusters, ffi; and roi, defined by 
the group-average clustering method may be expressed as: 
5. Missing values are interpolated by other variables. 
6. With only 18 observations in our sample, it is difficult to choose a proper 
mathematical form to express the distribution of this data set. 
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(2) 
where . I roi I denotes the number of objects in the cluster. For the centroid 
clustenng method, a cluster, (J)., once formed is represented by its centroid x(ro) 
which, together with its coordinates xk(roj) (for k=1,2, ... p), may be expressed ~s; 
(3) 
The dissimilarity c~efficie~t, d(roi.~). between two clusters, roi and~. is then 
defined as the Euchdean dtstance between two centroids. 
Bot~ ~ethods start from a classification denoted Q 0=[ro1°, ... ,~0] with N 
clusters m 1t, and .each clust~r containing only one object. The algorithms 
P.roceed by s~ccesst~ely mergmg two clusters into one at each stage until a 
smgle clust~r ts obtamed. The merging criterion at each stage is to choose two 
clusters _whtch have the least dissimilarity between them. A new classification 
at sta.ge.t, ~;~[~1', .... ~.;']. is identified after two clusters have been merged and 
the disst~lartttes between clusters may be updated. For example, rot and ~i-1 
at st~ge ;~; 1 may; be merged to form a n~'; cluster roi at stage i, the dissimilarity 
d(~ ,mm ) of ro, to any other cluster rom- may be updated in centroid clustering 
by using the following formula 
The centroid of roi may always be written as a function of those of fJ).i-1 and ro\. i-
1, as J wk 
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(5) 
In a similar way, the dissimilarity of a new cluster to any other cluster may also 
be updated using the group-average clustering method. 
Ill. The results: identifying homogeneous groups 
We begin by commenting on some features of the data as summarized in Table 
2, where three clusters are distinguished for each variable, rated "high" 
"medium" and "low". Some features that stand out are the high business cycle 
correlation with Germany, that is enjoyed by Japan; and, whereas many 
European countries also share this feature, there are a number which do not, 
including the UK, Ireland and the Scandinavian group, with Finland's position 
being notably low (-0.075 according to Table 1). ERM countries occupy the low 
exchange rate volatility position, though Austria, Switzerland and Norway have 
also maintained a non-volatile exchange rate vis-a-vis the DM; Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, also ERM participants, occupy the middle position whilst the USA, 
Canada, Japan and the UK have maintained the most volatile exchange rate 
relationships. The highest correlations with German monetary policy are 
maintained by the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Switzerland. Austria is 
placed in the middle group. When it comes to trade, Austria is in a class of its 
own, whilst all the other European countries are grouped together in a large 
middle group; the USA, Canada and Japan are in a different, lower, category. 
Inflation differentials of most countries are mostly low, only Portugal and 
Greece being in a "high" group, Italy and Spain in a "middle" group with the 
remaining countries in the "low" group. The final variable is that of the 
employment protection legislation (EPL) ranking. This shows the US, Canada 
and the UK among the least heavily protected and the Mediterranean countries 
(Italy, Spain, Portugal) among the most heavily protected. 
The basis for cluster analysis is recognition of similarity. Using the variables 
suggested by optimal currency area theory in this context sorts countries into 
groups with similar characteristics in the space of these criteria. In most cases 
it is easy to interpret how belonging to a particular group is "favourable" from 
the point of view of functioning in a currency union with Germany; for 
example, a high business cycle correlation is favourable; a high proportion of 
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trade is favourable, and so on. There is one characteristic where there 
is some ambiguity - namely the measure of employment protection legislation. 
Here OCA theory suggests that a low EPL ranking is good; yet Germany's own 
ranking is relatively high. Is it "good" to be "like Germany" in this "bad" 
respect? Is it better to be unlike Germany? OCA theory suggests a positive 
answer to the last question. Our techniques, though, will tend to put into the 
core group countries that are similar to Germany in this "bad" respect as in 
others. This needs to be borne in mind in the interpretation to be placed on the 
results. 
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The groups 
The groups identified by applying cluster analysis to the whole data set 
described in Table 17 are shown in Table 3 and, graphically, m the two 
dendograms, Figures 1 and 2. 
Clusters 
17 
16 
15 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
Notes: 
Table 3. Merging process by group average /centroid clustering 
Group average clustering 
Clusters joined 
{US. Canada) 
{Ireland, Norway) 
{Sweden, UK) 
{France, Belgium} 
{Finland, Cluster-16) 
{Ciuster-13, Cluster-15) 
{Portugal, Greece} 
{Italy, Spain) 
{Netherlands, Cluster-14) 
{Denmark, Cluster-12) 
{ Cluster-10, Cluster-! I } 
{Austria, Cluster-9) 
{Switzerland, Cluster-S) 
{Japan, Cluster-17) 
{Cluster-4, Cluster-5) 
{Ciuster-3, Cluster-?) 
{ Cluster-2, Cluster-6) 
Pseudo RMS 
F' distance' 
31.1 .18 
28.7 .21 
17.0 .36 
13.8 .40 
11.9 .44 
9.6 .45 
9.8 .47 
9.5 .56 
9.4 .56 
9.3 .58 
9.2 .65 
9.0 .77 
8.9 .81 
10.0 .82 
9.3 .91 
7.6 1.04 
1.19 
Centroid clustering 
Clusters joined 
{US, Canada} 
{Ireland, Norway} 
{UK, Sweden} 
{Ciuster-15, Cluster-16} 
{Finland, Cluster-14} 
{France, Belgium) 
{Portugal, Greece} 
{Denmark, Cluster-13} 
{Netherlands, Cluster-12} 
{Italy, Cluster-11} 
{Spain. Cluster-S} 
{Austria, Cluster-9) 
{Cluster-?, Cluster-10} 
{Switzerland, Cluster-6) 
{Japan, Cluster-!?} 
{Ciuster-3, Cluster-5} 
{Ciuster-2, Cluster-4} 
Pseudo RMS 
F' distance' 
31.1 .18 
28.7 .21 
17.0 .36 
9.7 .40 
9.0 .38 
9.6 .40 
9.8 .47 
8.7 .52 
8.7 .53 
8.9 .55 
9.2 .57 
9.0 .71 
5.9 .72 
6.7 .76 
8.7 .81 
8.6 .83 
.91 
I. The pseudo F statistic measures the separation among all the clusters at the current level and may be used 
as an indicator of the number of clusters (see SAS/STAT User's Guide for more technical details). 
2. "RMS distance" stands for the normalized root-mean-square distance. 
7 In applying the cluster analysis, the data were normalized to mean zero, unit variance: 
in this sense the criteria are equally weighted. All the variables in Table I are 
continuous except the labour market indicator which is an ordinal variable. In this 
study, the ranks of the labour market indicator are treated as interval-scaled and 
normalized to mean zero and unit variance in order to obtain equal weighting of the 
variables. In Appendix B, we report some results achieved by using an explicit 
weighting. 
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Two alternative clustering methods are applied to ensure that the results are 
not over-sensitive to the agglomerative criterion employed, which it immediately 
appears from Table 3 that they are not. Thus, for convenience, we may 
concentrate on the results achieved using group average clustering method in the 
following discussion. As a general remark, we may note that the agglomerative 
coefficient (AC) yielded by the application of this method here is satisfactorily 
high, at a value of 0.61, suggesting that a "reasonable" amount of structure has 
been identified in the data8• The pseudo-F statistic for this method peaks at 10 
indicating that there might be 4 clusters in the data, though we are not 
concerned here to search for an optimal number of clusters so much as to 
describe the data in a hierarchical way. 
A clear pattern which may be observed is that various distinct groups are 
formed at various stages and one of most interesting features of Figure 1 is that 
a classification containing 5 groups is identified at stage 12 which may 
described as consisting of: 
1) the core group {France, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria}; 
2) the Northern periphery group {Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland}; 
3) the Southern periphery group {Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece}; 
4) the North American group {the US, Canada}; 
5) the Japanese group {Japan}. 
The core group 
The core group is identified as one containing France, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Austria. The merging process for this group has France merging with 
Belgium with the dissimilarity coefficient at 0.40 at stage 4 and then being 
joined by the Netherlands and Austria with coefficients at 0.56 and 0.77 at stage 
9 and 12 respectively. The merging process for the core group suggests that the 
economies of France and Belgium are the most alike within the core group. It 
is of interest to note that no other single country is allowed to be. ro.erged into 
this group until the final stage when all countries are grouped, indicating that the 
countries in the core group have some distinct common features not fully shared 
by other countries. These features are readily apparent in Table 2 and include 
1) a high business cycle correlation with Germany; 2) a low volatility of the real 
8. A value of the AC close to I indicates that a clear .structure has been identified and 
a value close to 0 indicates that there is no structure in the data set: (see Kaufman and 
Rousseeuw (1990) for a discussion). 
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exchange rate against the DM; 3) synchronization in monetary policy with 
Germany; 4) high percentage of trade with Germany; 5) convergence of inflation 
towards the German level and 6) similar rankings of employment protection 
legislation as Germany. On this evidence, the economies in the core group are 
much more symmetrical than the EMU group as a whole, suggesting that 
countries in the core group are the best candidates to form a monetary union. It 
is in this sense then that we can refer to this subgroup as a core group: France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria, together with Germany. 
The Northern periphery group 
The Northern periphery group, {Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland}, has 7 countries which are merged at stage 13. The 
merging process for this group is also striking in that a group of five countries, 
{Ireland, the UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland}, is formed at a very early stage of 
the merging process (stage 6) with Denmark joining in at stage lO and 
Switzerland much later at stage 13. The group thus contains the Scandinavian 
countries, UK-Ireland and then Switzerland. 
The merging process of this group suggests that economies measured by the 
OCA criteria are much more similar within the group than between groups. We 
can refer to this subgroup as a peripheral group in the sense that it distances 
itself from the core. The distance between the two groups predominantly reflects 
the phenomena in the periphery group that 1) the business cycle is less 
synchronised with the German cycle; 2) the exchange rate against the DM is 
more volatile and 3) there is less protection in the labour market. 
It may be of interest to note that Switzerland is quite a different case among 
the European countries in the sense that it is merged into the periphery group 
when the group average clustering method is used, and merged into the core 
group when the centroid clustering method is used, but in both cases only at a 
very late stage. This reflects the phenomena that its business cycle is not in 
phase with the German cycle and its labour market is different from the German 
one, whilst at the same time Switzerland has a large trade with Germany and a 
sympathetic monetary policy. 
The Southern periphery group 
The merging process for the Southern periphery or Mediterranean group is as 
follows: Portugal and Greece are grouped at stage 7; Italy and Spain are merged 
at .sta~e 8; the tw~ groups are fused into one at stage 11. This group becomes 
qmte mdependent m the sense that it merges neither with the core nor with the 
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Northern periphery group until a very late stage, suggesting that the intra-group 
structure in Mediterranean countries is much more similar than the inter-group 
structure. 
The predominant features in the group may be described as 1) a medium 
volatility in the exchange rate against the DM; 2) low synchronisation in the 
interest rate cycle; 3) dispersion in the rate of inflation against the German one 
and 4) high employment protection legislation in their labour markets. 
The North American group 
The US and Canada are merged into one group at stage one with the lowest 
dissimilarity coefficient (0.18) among all countries, indicating that the two 
countries have the most similar economic structure (recall that, by construction, 
the relevant similarity here is distance from Germany). The group has distinct 
features in the sense that no single country is allowed to be merged into this 
group until stage 14 when Japan joins in. As mentioned earlier the purpose of 
including these three countries was to introduce a control on the power of the 
methods adopted in the study. Given our a priori economic knowledge, these 
countries should be sharply distinguished from the European countries and the 
method would have failed had this feature not appeared in our results. 
Are certain criteria dominant ? 
A subsidiary motivation for this paper was to examine whether certain of the 
OCA criteria could be described as dominant, meaning by this whether the 
results arrived at in Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2 could not have been reached 
by processing, say, only two OCA criteria. In particular, it seems an interesting 
speculation to test whether a concentration on trade and output shocks alone 
would not produce a similar identification of core and periphery. 
Table 4 provides material for an answer to this question. It identifies five 
clusters from a data set initially consisting in only two variables - the trade and 
business cycle correlation variables; then performs the identification afresh with 
reference to a data set augmented by a third variable (exchange rate volatility), 
then again with a data set augmented by a fourth variable, and so on. Every 
combination identifies Japan and the North American group as separate groups. 
Every combination identifies in the core group the four countries: 
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Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands; and every combination 
identifies a European "periphery" group. But it is only when the EPL variable 
is added that the separate identity of a Southern or Mediterranean group within 
the periphery is clearly established. For three out of the five criteria sets Austria 
is identified as a separate group (a super-core). 
Thus it seems that whilst some of the major features identified on the full 
data set are already present when only the trade and output shocks criteria are 
deployed, additional variables do add value and help to identify the features 
noted in Table 3. A related issue to the one explored here is that of weighting. 
Are some variables more important that others? Those processed here are not 
expressed in a common scale, and although they are normalized and equally 
weighted in that sense it is not obvious how important each criteria is relative 
to another. For this reason we have taken an agnostic approach in arriving at our 
main results. In Appendix B we explore a weighting scheme which, however, 
does not yield any major conclusions that conflict with those reported here. 
IV. Conclusions 
To summarize, our application of cluster analysis to a data set constructed to 
reflect OCA criteria indicates that the potential European Monetary Union 
countries consist in a core group revolving around Germany, which comprises 
France, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands, with two peripheral groups - a 
"Northern group" containing the Scandinavian countries together with the UK 
and Ireland, and a "Southern group" containing Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. The USA and Canada are separately identified as a "North American" 
group, whilst Japan also stands out as having individual features. This summary 
can be expressed graphically using the technique of the "faces" representation 
of multivariate data. 
A Faces representation of OCA criteria 
"Faces" representation of multivariate data has been proposed by Chernoff 
(1973) and by Flury and Riedwyl (1981). This technique may be helpful in 
viewing interesting patterns or structure in a sample. Six features suggested in 
the paper are represented by a set of cartoon faces shown in Figure 3. In the 
Figure, each observation depicts one feature of the face: 1) correlation in 
business cycle by the fatness of the face; 2) volatility in the exchange rate by 
the curve of the mouth; 3) correlation in interest rate by the distance between 
the eyes; 4) percentage of total trade by the length of the nose; 5) inflation 
differentials by the shape of the eyebrow and 6) labour market flexibility by the 
19 
size of the ears. The appearance of the faces indeed suggests that there is a clear 
similarity between the faces in the groups and that the intra-group structure is 
much more similar than the inter-group structure. 
Comparisons 
How do our identifications compare with those made by others using different 
methods (and criteria)? Our definition of a core with one or more one periphery 
groups is very close to some of the other identifications of groups to be found 
in the literature. For example, a core group ready for EMU and a group pot 
ready for EMU as viewed by Taylor (1995) consists of, respectively, a group 
formed by Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark (if 
willing), Austria plus (tentatively) France; and a group of four: Portugal, Greece, 
Spain plus (tentatively) Italy. He also views Finland, Sweden, Ireland and the 
UK as countries which are left in between. Canzoneri et al. ( 1996) examine a 
smaller set of countries (Austria, the Netherlands, France, Spain, the UK and 
Italy) using a VAR approach 
20 
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to answer the question whether or not nominal exchange rate changes appear to 
act as a shock absorber for market disturbances. Their largely negative answer 
leads them to identify an inner core of Austria, the Netherlands and France as 
fit for monetary union, but with little to distinguish that group from Spain and 
the UK, where also nominal exchange rate changes appear to be responding to 
promptings arising in the financial markets rather than in the goods markets. 
Italy is the most exceptional country in their analysis. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993) define a core and periphery based on identifying cross-correlations of 
supply and demand disturbances. That core contains, along with Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and France. 
In later work (Bayoumi & Eichengreen 1997a, 1997b), the same two authors 
extend their criteria set and identify three groups among the eligible countries 
(with Norway and Switzerland also included). In (1997a) a "fully convergent" 
group, centred on Germany, comprises also Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands but excludes France whilst also admitting Ireland and Switzerland. 
A second group of "converging" countries is identified as comprising the 
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) together with 
Sweden, whilst there is a third group of "unconverged", more distant, countries 
which includes the UK, Finland, Denmark, Norway and France. The results in 
(1997b) are similar. Clearly these identifications are similar to, though not 
identical with, our own. 
Implications 
What are the implications of results like these? In the introduction to this paper 
we suggested that the analysis might help rationalize the position of various 
countries vis-a-vis EMU. The caution of the UK, Sweden and Denmark could 
indeed be regarded as underlined by our results, as also the reserved position 
(even on membership of the EU) taken by Norway and Switzerland. Enthusiasm 
in Finland and Ireland and in all the Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, 
does not appear to be explained by our findings, which place all these countries 
in a peripheral position. Of course, there are some economic advantages, not 
to mention perceived political benefits which may accrue to these countries that 
are not recognised in our criteria set. We also mentioned that a finding of 
inhomogeneity in the ranks of the putative EMU must suggest that a "one-size-
fits-all" monetary policy will be inappropriate to certain member countries and 
could threaten the union's sustainability. A key issue here, which this analysis 
cannot comment upon, is how far this problem will prove transitory (as the 
"endogeneity" literature suggests) or, on the other hand, persistent. 
22 
= = = = = = = = = = 
"'"' v-: v-: 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
~~~~~~ 
oc ~ oe oo :x: 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
..,f. V ~ ..J. ..J. 
R R ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ = ~ = = = = 9 
.;.; 
o;o 
~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Appendix B: Weighting the criteria 
The data employed in the main analysis of this paper are weighted equally. 
However, it might be argued that whilst one of the variables employed (bilateral 
trade intensity) represents a measure of benefit, four of the others (business 
cycle correlation; real interest rate correlation, real exchange rate volatility and 
EPC ranking) are m effect different measures of cost, whilst the inflation 
differential variable is a kind of normalizing variable. Hence it might seem (that 
"costs" are being given a bigger weight than "benefits". We have to reiterate that 
this is not clear, because the variables are not initially measured in a common 
metric (say as GDP gain or loss); but it is instructive to consider what happens 
when an explicit weighting is introduced. Accordingly, in Table B we present 
the results of weighting the "benefit" (trade) variable equally with the sum of the 
four "cost" variables and the normalizing variable (inflation differential). 
The table compares the results obtained for 3, 4, 5 and 6 clusters with 
criterion-variables weighted and unweighted. One difference that can be seen is 
that weighting trade highly promotes Austria to a "super-core" group: however 
many clusters are distinguished. Then, also, the additional weight given to 
inflation tends to isolate Portugal and Greece. Switzerland and Denmark join the 
core group when trade is given more weight. But the core remains otherwise the 
same as when the variables are unweighted, and the Northern peripheral 
countries remain the same except that Denmark leaves whilst Italy and Spain 
join that group. The core-periphery structure, in other words, remains 
substantially the same as it appears in the main analysis. 
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